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How emergency managers  
(mis?)interpret forecasts
Kris Wernstedt, Patrick S. Roberts, Joseph Arvai, and Kelly Redmond1
Emergency managers who work on floods and other weather-related hazards constitute critical 
frontline responders to disasters. Yet, while these professionals operate in a realm rife with uncer-
tainty related to forecasts and other unknowns, the influence of uncertainty on their decision-
making is poorly understood. Consequently, a national-level survey of county emergency managers 
in the United States was administered to examine how they interpret forecast information, using 
hypothetical climate, flood, and weather scenarios to simulate their responses to uncertain infor-
mation. The study revealed that even emergency managers with substantial experience take deci-
sion shortcuts and make biased choices, just as do members of the general population. Their 
choices vary depending on such features as the format in which probabilistic forecasts are presented 
and whether outcomes are represented as gains or losses. In sum, forecast producers who consider 
these decision processes when developing and communicating forecasts could help to improve flood 
preparation and potentially reduce disaster losses.
Keywords: cognitive, decision-making, emergency management, risk, uncertainty
Introduction
For decades, meteorologists, psychologists, and others in the disaster community 
have conducted studies on challenges in communicating weather-related forecasts 
(Scoggins and Vaughan, 1971; Murphy et al., 1980; Sink, 1995; Nicholls, 1999; Adams 
and Golden, 2000; Gigerenzer et al., 2005; Morss, Demuth, and Lazo, 2008; Joslyn, 
Nadav-Greenberg, and Nichols, 2009; Joslyn and Nichols, 2009; Joslyn, Savelli, and 
Nadav-Greenberg, 2011; LeClerc, 2014; Morss et al., 2015). These analyses have doc-
umented that information processing and decision shortcuts often lead forecast users 
within the general public to behave ‘irrationally’ or predictably incorrectly when 
faced with uncertain information. For instance, users may interpret probabilities 
differently than is the intention of providers, or anchor themselves to initial estimates 
and not adjust when new information becomes available. More broadly, the public’s 
use of available forecast information to reduce weather-related disaster damage 
appears to depend critically on risk perception and communication, as highlighted 
by recent work on forecast and weather warning interpretation of, and responses to, 
floods (Demeritt and Nobert, 2014; Silver, 2015), hurricanes (Lazo et al., 2015; Morss 
and Demuth, 2016), and tornadoes (Miller, Adame, and Moore, 2013; Stokoe, 2016). 
 The research reported here extends these evaluations by focusing on county emer-
gency managers (EMs) in the United States, local-level professionals who apply manage-
ment, planning, science, and technology to deal with flooding that can cause property 
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damage, disrupt community life, and kill or injure people (Hoetmer, 1991, p. xvii). 
Do these first-responder experts face the same kind of decision constraints revealed 
in other assessments of forecast use in weather-related disasters, almost all of which 
have examined the general public (see, for example, Joslyn, Nadav-Greenberg, and 
Nichols 2009; Lazo, Morss, and Demuth, 2009; Joslyn and Savelli, 2010; Joslyn and 
LeClerc, 2012; LeClerc and Joslyn, 2015; Zabini et al., 2015). Only a small number 
have concentrated on professionals involved with forecasts, such as the forecasters 
themselves (Demeritt et al., 2007, 2013; Pappenberger et al., 2013), experts interested 
in using flood visualisation tools (Frick and Hegg, 2011), and emergency service 
providers (Kox, Gerhold, and Ulbrich, 2015). In addition, do local emergency man-
agers face the same difficulties in interpreting seasonal forecasts with lead times of 
months—where the pressures for quick decision-making are weaker—as Coventry 
and Dalgleish (2015) found for lay people? 
 Certainly, advances in science and technology and the era of big data suggest 
greater potential for utilising short- and long-term forecast information to decrease 
flood-related losses. Improvements in remotely-sensed data collection and applica-
tion and the development of physically-based distributed hydrological models have 
significantly enhanced six-hour flash-flood forecasting, for instance (Hapuarachchi, 
Wang, and Pagano, 2011), and numerical bias-corrected, ensemble forecasts now 
notably outperform experienced human forecasters (Novak et al., 2014). On the 
longer time horizon, the Climate Prediction Center, the International Research 
Institute for Climate Prediction, and other organisations have taken advantage of 
research conducted over the past few decades and developed a number of long-lead 
forecasts (seasonal to 12 months) that offer modest to moderate skill in some regions 
to predict the impacts on the ground (Barnston et al., 1994; Dutton, 2002; Livezey 
and Timofeyeva, 2008; O’Lenic et al., 2008). Furthermore, researchers have docu-
mented numerous cases of innovative use of seasonal climate information in particu-
lar instances (Pielke, Jnr. and Pielke, Snr., 1997; Changnon, 1999; Pielke, Jnr. and 
Landsea, 1999; Pulwarty and Melis, 2001; Hartmann et al., 2002; Wernstedt and 
Hersh, 2004). 
 Overall, however, seasonal forecasts have a mixed track record of actual sustained 
use by decision-makers on the ground (see, for example, Millner and Washington, 
2011). The evidence suggests that the application of long- and short-term flood and 
streamflow forecasts to reduce disaster losses needs to surmount systematic challenges. 
Sorensen and Mileti (1987) underlined decades ago that numerous factors can bedevil 
organisational decision-making and constrain the effectiveness of forecasts and other 
warnings in hazard contexts, including difficulties in recognising and interpreting 
indicators associated with threatening events and distinguishing relevant from irrel-
evant information, and concerns about taking action that produces adverse conse-
quences for the public or a loss of personal reputation. More specific to flooding, 
Pagano et al. (2014) trace a litany of factors pertaining to deficient data availability 
and quality, model limitations, insufficient attention to user needs, and socio-cultural 
institutional constraints that inhibit operational river forecasting. 
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 Consistent with these difficulties, Werner, Averyt, and Owen (2013) draw on a 
series of workshops to demonstrate the limited use of probabilistic forecast informa-
tion in water resource management scenarios involving forecast providers, water 
managers, and others interested in learning more about forecast methods. Our own 
survey of 48 EMs in Oregon, US, identified only two who used seasonal climate 
forecasts to help them decide to take action before a flood season (Roberts and 
Wernstedt, 2016), despite a strong connection between seasonal climate events and 
flooding in the region (Wernstedt and Hersh, 2002). Moreover, while not focused 
on probabilistic information per se, the study by Peerbolte and Collins (2013) of 
emergency managers’ critical thinking skills—which they measured by applying a 
validated critical thinking measurement tool used in other parts of the country to 
a sample of local EMs in Virginia, US—suggests that EMs may have less ability to 
assume and manage risk as compared to the average of other peer-level managers 
without emergency management responsibilities. 
 This paper investigates one of the barriers noted in the other investigations: the 
cognitive challenges that uncertain information may pose to short- and longer-term 
forecast use by EMs. Uncertainty, here, means information with stochastic proper-
ties or probabilities of outcomes, rather than information that is simply ‘unknown’. 
The work draws on the results of our recent nationwide survey of 231 county-level 
EMs engaged in flood planning.
Decision-making under the condition of uncertainty
Barriers to more ubiquitous forecast use exist partly because local EMs must make 
decisions in a world rife with uncertainty. The psychology of decision-making under 
the condition of uncertainty suggests that unaided or ad hoc judgements frequently 
fail to yield informed, thoughtful, and sustainable choices and instead may introduce 
systematic biases into decision-making (Gregory et al., 2012). These biases often 
follow from the use of heuristics or rules of thumb that people employ in assessing 
probabilities, which may stand them in good stead in situations that are familiar, but 
can be problematic in unfamiliar contexts. For example, prospect theory (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979) suggests that individuals evaluate gains and losses differently and 
look at the values of these relative to the status quo, rather than select an alternative 
that leaves them the best off. Potential losses regularly loom larger in a decision cal-
culus than seemingly equivalent gains, so the loss to an individual from inadvert-
ently having USD 100 fall out of a pocket while jogging in the park may represent 
a greater change in value (a loss) than does inadvertently finding USD 100 while 
out for a run (a gain). More generally, individuals often make choices differently 
depending on factors external or irrelevant to the decision at hand, thereby violating 
a central tenet of rational choice theory. 
 Such biases are compounded by shortfalls in numeracy skills, that is, the ability to 
apply basic probability and numeric concepts to decision-making. For instance, those 
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with more limited numeracy skills are more likely to view a bad outcome represented 
as occurring in 10 per cent of cases differently than a bad outcome represented as 
occurring in 10 out of 100 cases, even though the two are numerically equivalent. 
Such shortfalls can exacerbate problems particularly in emotionally charged situations, 
compromising the capability to make good decisions with probabilistic informa-
tion on weather forecasts and in other circumstances (Peters et al., 2006; Joslyn and 
Nichols, 2009). While some evidence suggests that most individuals generally under-
stand uncertainty better when it is presented as a frequency rather than as a probability 
(Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995), including in some seasonal climate forecasting set-
tings (Coventry and Dalgleish, 2015), the Joslyn and Nichols (2009) study of weather 
(wind speed) forecasts shows the opposite. Moreover, understanding of the psycho-
logical processes undergirding numeracy challenges remains unsettled (Gigerenzer, 
1994; Slovic, Monahan, and MacGregor, 2000; Reyna and Brainerd, 2008).
 In addition, the possible presence of ‘attribution bias’ means that different indi-
viduals in the chain of actors that turn a forecast into an action on the ground may 
anticipate, evaluate, or explain the motivations and actions of others in using fore-
casts differently than their own. This term reflects most generally a tendency for 
individuals to overemphasise the role of personality in explaining the behaviour of 
others, rather than the situational context of the behaviour, and to do the reverse 
for one’s own behaviour. This can lead to a number of observed biases in group 
decision-making, such as the development of false consensus, and can exacerbate 
self-serving biases in which individuals may remain immune to constructive nega-
tive feedback. 
Survey of emergency managers
Nichols (1999) summarised these and other biases as they relate to the climate fore-
cast community nearly 20 years ago, but, with a few recent exceptions (see, for 
example, Demeritt et al., 2013; Pappenberger et al., 2013; Hoss and Fischbeck, 2015; 
Morss et al., 2015), most of the work on decision-making under forecast uncertainty 
related to risk, heuristic biases, and framing has assessed decision-making and risk 
perceptions among the general public, rather than among professionals who make 
decisions in work environments. To probe the latter, investigators typically have 
relied on controlled laboratory experiments in which university students take on 
the role of decision-makers acting in their professional capacity (see, for example, 
Joslyn and LeClerc, 2012). Older studies of actual weather forecasters by Murphy 
and Winkler (1977) and Stewart, Roebber, and Bosart (1997), though, indicate that, 
when compared to the general public, weather experts who regularly work with 
uncertain forecasts in professional settings have greater numeracy skills and a better 
ability to work with probabilities when tested in experimental situations. Hoss and 
Fishbeck (2015, p. 95) even suggest that ‘most EMs have found ways to cope with 
forecast uncertainty and do not perceive it to be a major problem’. 
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 Does this mean that emergency managers are immune to decision heuristics and 
biases? Or do many face the same challenges as the general public in interpreting 
uncertain information, even as they encounter it more routinely during disaster prep-
aration? Unfortunately, there is a lack of naturalistic decision-making studies (Klein, 
Orasanu, and Calderwood, 1993) of EMs in the field to understand how they pro-
cess uncertain information in real life. However, foreshadowing the conclusions of 
this study, the survey-based decision experiments in controlled settings with EMs in 
the US show that, in fact, they do confront similar challenges. 
 The survey questionnaire comprises 44 closed-ended questions, some of which 
relate to factual background information, such as the age, experience, and gender, 
of respondents, whereas others pertain to the hypothetical emergency management 
scenarios involving climate and flood forecasting uncertainty central to our experi-
ments. During the latter, emergency manager subjects were asked to choose from 
among different actions in response to a hypothetical scenario. For each question 
involving a hypothetical scenario, respondents were randomly assigned to one of 
four subgroups, with each subgroup receiving a different hypothetical situation, or 
treatment, in the language of survey design (see below). 
 Prior to circulating the final questionnaire, a prototype version of the survey was 
pre-tested with students to solicit opinions on the design. Based on this feedback, 
adjustments were made to the visual presentation of the questions and the text was 
shortened. Next, a pilot test was performed with individuals in the emergency man-
agement profession not already identified in the sampling frame. Responses to this 
pilot led to several questions being made more succinct. After a small pre-test, the 
online survey was administered to the final sampling frame: 1,350 county-level EMs 
in the US selected from a larger population of emergency managers with identifi-
able and valid email addresses acquired from public websites. Owing to concerns 
about lower response rates from rural counties due to more limited staff resources, 
this frame was stratified by rural and non-rural locations—delineated by using the 
federal Office of Management and Budget’s designation of core and outside-core 
counties (United States Office of Management and Budget, 2010)—and oversampled 
in rural locations by splitting the frame equally into rural and non-rural locations 
(rather than constructing it to reflect the minority proportion of counties that are 
rural). In addition, the overall size of the sampling frame was set so as to satisfy the 
need for a minimum of 200 responses (based on power calculations) and an assumed 
response rate of 15 per cent (based on the pre-test). The survey was circulated using 
email invitations and there were two rounds of follow-up with non-respondents. 
 The 231 respondents represent a response rate of 17.1 per cent, exceeding expec-
tations set by the pre-test and the 9–13 per cent level that the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency achieved in its 2010–12 annual survey of public officials on 
flood risk. The sample appears generally representative of the EM population. 
Table 1 presents a range of demographic and professional characteristics of the sample, 
as compared to those from a survey of more than 1,000 EMs conducted recently by 
Weaver et al. (2013). The group matches the latter sample with respect to gender 
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(overwhelmingly male) and closely resembles it in relation to other dimensions; that 
is, the EMs in this study sample are similar to the group in Weaver et al. (2013), but 
they are slightly older, less experienced, and not as likely to hold a graduate or profes-
sional degree, as well as having experienced floods more recently. The respondents 
in the current survey also appear comparable to groups of EMs assessed by Peerbolte 
and Collins (2013) and Jensen and Youngs (2015), who report samples similarly dom-
inated by older, educated, experienced males. As for the community setting, the 
proportion of respondents in this study who come from rural areas was similar to 
that in Weaver et al. (2013): 46 per cent. This slightly exceeds the proportion of the 
more than 3,000 counties in the US that are situated in rural areas: 41 per cent. The 
respondents come from 29 states, with Connecticut having the largest single share 
(11 per cent). Each of the four US census regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, and 
West) provides at least 30 respondents, but there is overrepresentation of the Midwest 
(53 per cent of respondents versus 34 per cent of counties) and underrepresentation 
in the South (14 versus 45 per cent). Weaver et al. (2013) have a similar underrep-
resentation of EMs from the South, although it is less sharp (33 versus 45 per cent). 
 This paper focuses on four of the decision scenarios presented to EMs—one rep-
resenting the numeracy problem and three pertaining to decision preferences with 
gains and losses. In each scenario, the survey software randomly assigned the EMs 
into four groups, with all members of each group facing the same treatment (same 
presentation of uncertainty) and treatments differing across groups. While this does 
not permit an examination of how a particular EM responds to different presenta-
tions of uncertainty in any one scenario (it is not a paired design), it does allow for 
a comparison of how groups of randomly selected EMs respond to different presenta-
tions of uncertainty. Moreover, the survey software randomly resorted respondents 
at the start of each new scenario to vary the composition of the groups. For instance, 
60 EMs belong to group C in the first scenario and 58 belong to group C in the 
second scenario, but only 10 of these belong to both groups.2 
Table 1. Summary measures (N=231)
Variable Percentage of  
study sample
Percentage of sample in 
Weaver et al. (2013)
Male 80.1 80.9
45 years and older* 86.2 71.0
10 or more years of work experience 63.2 71.2
Completed graduate or professional degree 19.0 23.4
Work mostly in rural areas 45.8 46.4
Flooding has occurred within the past 10 years 78.8 67.1
Note: * 46 years and older in the Weaver et al. (2013) survey.
Source: authors.
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Scenario I: numeracy and emergency managers
Each of the EMs who responded to the survey faced one of four possible versions 
of a hypothetical scenario about a long-term seasonal climate forecast predicting a 
destructive flood. The versions presented the likelihood of losses as low in two cases 
and high in two cases, but phrased it in different ways (1 out of every 10 or a 0.1 
probability for the two low likelihood cases, and 9 out of every 10 or a 0.9 probabil-
ity for the two high likelihood cases). Each EM was asked to imagine receiving a 
long-term forecast predicting weather events for the next three months that suggests 
a destructive flood might occur in their county sometime during that time frame. 
Here, a destructive flood means that a large number of the 1,000 homes in a vulner-
able community in their county could be severely damaged or destroyed. 
Figure 1. Hypothetical situations for the assessment of numeracy
A. Assume a vulnerable community in your county contains 1,000 homes, and the forecast predicts that  
1 out of every 10 homes could be severely damaged or destroyed if action to protect the community 
isn’t taken right now.
B. Assume a vulnerable community in your county contains 1,000 homes, and the forecast predicts that 
there is a 0.1 probability that homes could be severely damaged or destroyed if action to protect the 
community isn’t taken right now.
C. Assume a vulnerable community in your county contains 1,000 homes, and the forecast predicts that  
9 out of every 10 homes could be severely damaged or destroyed if action to protect the community 
isn’t taken right now.
D. Assume a vulnerable community in your county contains 1,000 homes, and the forecast predicts that 
there is a 0.9 probability that homes could be severely damaged or destroyed if action to protect the 
community isn’t taken right now.
Question 1: Of course, avoiding all losses is preferable to incurring some loss. But, assuming this prediction 
is accurate, how acceptable to you is this probability of loss if action isn’t taken?
Not at all acceptable              Somewhat acceptable                   Very acceptable
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Question 2: Assuming the final decision falls to you, how likely would you be to activate a costly emergency 
management plan right now that is intended to protect all of the homes in this community in case the destruc-
tive flood occurs?
Not at all likely                   Somewhat likely                            Very likely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Notes: each respondent sees one of the four hypothetical situations labelled A–D and then answers questions 1 and 2. The 
first two hypothetical situations, A and B, are numerically equivalent to each other but express uncertainty in different ways. 
Similarly, the last two hypothetical situations, C and D, are numerically equivalent to each other, but express uncertainty 
in different ways. 
Source: authors.
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 In each version of the scenario, EMs were questioned about the acceptability of 
the losses and the likelihood that they would activate a costly emergency manage-
ment plan when confronted with the prospect of the loss (see Figure 1). Possible 
responses spanned a seven-point scale ranging from one (‘not at all acceptable’) to 
seven (‘very acceptable’), with four indicating ‘somewhat acceptable’.
 The results in Table 2 reveal that the EMs did not respond the same to the different 
ways in which we presented long-term flood forecasts with numerically equivalent 
probabilities. Section (a) in Table 2 shows the results of the first question about the 
acceptability of flood losses in a low likelihood situation. More than 30 per cent of 
EMs who read the ‘1 out of 10’ uncertainty language indicated that the losses would 
be not at all acceptable (an acceptability rating of 1), but less than 15 per cent of EMs 
who read the ‘0.1 probability’ language did the same. Nearly 20 per cent of each of 
the two groups indicated that this probability of loss was ‘somewhat acceptable’ (an 
acceptability rating of four), but a much higher proportion of EMs who read the 
‘0.1 probability’ language rated the scenario as more acceptable than did the EMs 
who read the ‘1 out of 10’ language (that is, a much higher percentage selected an 
acceptability rating of five or more). 
 The differences between the two groups are significantly different statistically at 
the 0.05 level, using Somers’ D, a non-parametric test (Newson, 2002) of association 
between discrete variables in this case (one variable representing binary categories 
of treatments and the other representing Likert-scaled, ordinal responses). Values 
of Somers’ D range from -1.0 (perfect inverse association) to +1.0 (perfect positive 
association), with 0.0 indicating no association. The Somers’ D value of 0.23 in this 
scenario means that randomly selected EMs reading the ‘0.1’ language are 23 per 
cent more likely to rate the scenario as more acceptable than randomly selected EMs 
reading the ‘1 out of 10’ language.
Table 2. Acceptability of losses under different phrasing to describe flood likelihood*
Acceptability 10 per cent flood likelihood 90 per cent flood likelihood
(i) 1 out of 10  
probability language 
(ii) 0.1 probability 
language 
(iii) 9 out of 10  
probability language 
(iv) 0.9 probability 
language 
1 32 13 41 21
2 20 19 22 15
3 10 17 5 21
4 18 17 10 17
5 10 21 7 9
6 5 7 10 12
7 5 6 5 5
Notes: * Cell entries reflect the percentage of the responses of a group; columns sum 100 per cent.
Source: authors.
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 Section (b) of Table 2 shows the analogous results for a forecast probability of 90 
per cent. Sixty EMs were provided with the same general background of a vulner-
able community with 1,000 homes, and then presented with a forecast probability that 
9 out of every 10 homes could be severely damaged or destroyed if action to protect 
the community was not taken right now. Another 58 EMs were presented with a 
forecast of a 0.9 probability that homes could be severely damaged or destroyed if 
action to protect the community was not taken right now. These two expressions 
equate to an expected damage of 900 homes (90 per cent of 1,000). Once again, a 
much higher percentage of EMs who read the ‘9 out of 10’ language indicated that 
such losses would be ‘not at all acceptable’ (an acceptability rating of one) than did 
those who read the ‘0.9 probability’ language. This difference also is significantly 
different at the 0.05 level using the Somers’ D test. The same Somers’ D value of 
0.23 means that EMs who read the ‘0.9’ language in the context of the higher fore-
cast probability are also 23 per cent more likely to rate the scenario as more accept-
able than the EMs receiving that higher forecast probability who read the ‘9 out of 10’ 
language; that is, the higher acceptability of losses associated with the ‘0.1’ language 
persists across different levels of uncertainty.
 Table 3 presents the responses for an identical situation—a vulnerable community 
with 1,000 homes and with the same probabilities and ways of presenting uncer-
tainty—but addresses the likelihood that an EM would activate a costly emergency 
management plan to protect homes in the community (see question phrasing in 
Figure 1). Responses range from one (‘not at all likely’) to seven (‘very likely’), with 
four indicating ‘somewhat likely’. The patterns of responses between the two ways 
of presenting uncertainty deviate sharply for the 10 per cent forecast likelihood. 
Section (a) in Table 3 shows that a much higher percentage of EMs presented with 
Table 3. The likelihood of activating an emergency plan when different phrasing is 




10 per cent flood likelihood 90 per cent flood likelihood
(i) 1 out of 10  
probability language
(ii) 0.1 probability 
language 
(iii) 9 out of 10  
probability language 
(iv) 0.9 probability 
language
1 0 6 0 2
2 2 23 0 9
3 12 13 8 10
4 18 19 23 26
5 28 11 15 15
6 20 19 34 21
7 20 9 20 17
Notes: * Cell entries reflect the percentage of the responses of a group; columns sum 100 per cent.
Source: authors.
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the ‘0.1 probability’ language are not as likely to activate an emergency management 
plan in response to the forecast as those presented with the ‘1 out of 10’ language. 
Conversely, a much higher percentage of those who received the ‘1 out of 10’ phras-
ing expressed a high likelihood of activating the plan. This is statistically different at 
the 0.01 level of significance. Here the Somers’ D value of -0.35 indicates that those 
who read the ‘0.1’ language are 35 per cent less likely to take action than those who 
read the ‘1 out of 10’ language. The differences appear less stark with a forecast prob-
ability of 90 per cent in section (b) of Table 3—as indicated by a Somers’ D value 
closer to zero—and are significantly different only at the 0.1 level. We cannot explain 
this difference to our satisfaction, but it is possible that such a high likelihood forecast 
is so outside of emergency managers’ experience as to be unrealistic or, alternatively, 
that it poses such a threat that the difference in the forecast language gets overshadowed. 
 These results suggest that for both low and high likelihood long-range flood fore-
casts, numeracy challenges influence the acceptability of losses and management 
responses to forecasts. Joslyn and Nichols (2009) reveal a similar phenomenon in 
experiments on wind speed forecasts that used different ways of presenting uncer-
tainty, but unlike their study, we cannot say that expressing a forecast probability as 
a ratio or frequency to an EM yields a better decision or outcome than presenting 
it as a proportion, or vice versa. Rather, the first scenario shows that EMs respond to 
numerically equivalent forecasts expressed in different ways. 
 Recent work suggests that the format of risk information in flood forecasts influ-
ences the perceived usefulness of the information in decision-making, with quantita-
tive (probabilistic) and semi-quantitative (ranking) presentations judged as superior 
to qualitative approaches (Lin et al., 2017). However, the results of the Scenario I 
exercise point to the more basic problem identified by Joslyn and Nichols (2009), 
namely that limitations in the ability to process numerical information can lead to 
different decisions. In this study, it may be that EMs judge the likelihoods of losses 
expressed as 0.1 as less threatening than those expressed as 1 in 10 because they 
anchor to the ‘0’, making the loss appear less possible. Regardless of the explanation, 
the numeracy limitation amplifies the previously identified need for forecasts and 
loss estimates to be set out in a variety of formats. In short, producers of information 
should not assume that one format will correctly translate the facts of the situation, 
since different expressions of the same expected utility produced different assessments 
among the respondents.
Scenario II: prospect theory and emergency managers
The second scenario in the survey questionnaire tests the applicability of prospect 
theory in the decision science literature to emergency management of floods; that 
is, it assesses whether EMs would take the same action when a problem is framed 
in terms of losses as when it is framed in terms of gains. In this case, the EMs were 
again divided into four groups, with each group seeing one of four versions of a 
hypothetical flood that differ in the way in which uncertain damage is presented 
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(framed as a ‘gain’ of saving 25 homes from being destroyed out of 100 homes versus 
framed as a ‘loss’ of losing 75 out of 100 homes) and in the extent of damage associ-
ated with the flood (saving/losing 25/75 out of 100 homes versus saving/losing 
125/375 out of 500 homes). 
 Each pair of versions poses the same trade-off to EMs. In the ‘gain’ framing ver-
sion of the 100 homes problem, the EM can choose either a sure outcome of saving 
25 per cent of the homes or a gamble with a 25 per cent likelihood of saving all of the 
homes and a 75 per cent likelihood of saving none of the homes. In the ‘loss’ framing 
version of the 100 homes problem, the EM can choose either a sure outcome of losing 
75 per cent of the homes or a gamble with a 75 per cent likelihood of losing all of the 
homes and a 25 per cent likelihood of losing none of the homes. The expected value 
for versions with the same number of homes are identical (25 homes remain intact in 
both 100-home versions and 125 homes remain intact in both 500-home versions).
 Table 4 shows the results of the ‘gain’ and ‘loss’ framing for both the 100- and 500-
home cases. The rows in the table represent changes in the framing of the choice, 
with the light grey-shaded rows representing a ‘gain’ frame (rows one and three for 
the 100- and 500-home situation, respectively), and the darker grey-shaded rows 
representing a ‘loss’ frame (rows two and four for the 100- and 500-home situation, 
respectively). Numbers in each row of the table sum 100; that is, they represent the 
percentage of respondents seeing that particular frame who chose a more risk-averse 
Table 4. Gain and loss framing
RISK AVERSE 
100 homes at risk
% RISK SEEKING
100 homes at risk
%
(1) Plan guaranteed to save exactly 25 homes.
65
Plan has a 25 per cent chance of saving 100 
homes and a 75 per cent chance of saving  
zero homes. 
35
(2) Plan guaranteed to result in the destruction of 
exactly 75 homes.
9
Plan has a 75 per cent chance of resulting in  
the destruction of 100 homes and a 25 per  




500 homes at risk
% RISK SEEKING
500 homes at risk
%
(3) Plan guaranteed to save exactly 125 homes.
67
Plan has a 25 per cent chance of saving 500 
homes and a 75 per cent chance of saving  
zero homes.
33
(4) Plan guaranteed to result in the destruction of 
exactly 375 homes.
11
Plan has a 75 per cent chance of resulting in  
the destruction of 500 homes and a 25 per  
cent chance of resulting in the destruction of  
zero homes.
89
Notes: the lighter grey cells signify respondents receiving a gain (‘save’) frame, whereas the darker grey 
cells signify respondents receiving a loss (‘destroy’) frame. The numbers in each pair of numbers in the 
two columns in each section, (a) and (b), sum 100 per cent.
Source: authors.
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action (section (a)) plus the percentage who chose a more risk-seeking action (sec-
tion (b)). For example, looking at the first row of Table 4, when presented with a flood 
that threatens 100 homes and given the choice of implementing a plan ‘guaranteed 
to save exactly 25 homes from being destroyed’ or one that offers ‘a 25 per cent chance 
of saving 100 homes from being destroyed, and a 75 per cent chance of saving zero 
homes from being destroyed’, 65 per cent of the respondents chose the first plan (row 
one, section (a)) and the other 35 per cent chose a more risky but potentially more 
beneficial plan that could potentially save all 100 homes (row one, section (b)). 
 In both the 100- and 500-home situations, around two-thirds of EMs select the 
sure outcome (a guaranteed saving of 25 or 125 homes out of 100 and 500 homes in 
section (a), rows one and three, respectively) when the decision context is framed 
as a gain (homes saved); that is, EMs are averse to gambling with benefits. The remain-
ing one-third seeing the gain frame chose the more risk-seeking alternative, evincing 
a willingness to gamble with benefits. 
 The choices appear radically different for those respondents seeing the problem 
framed as losses. Only roughly one-tenth of respondents in both the 100- and 500-
home situations select the sure outcome (a guaranteed loss of 75 or 375 homes out 
of 100 and 500 homes in section (a), rows 2 and 4, respectively). The other 90 per 
cent or so choose the more risk-seeking alternative by gambling to save 75 per cent 
of the homes from being destroyed against all of the homes being destroyed. 
 A direct comparison of the respective gain and loss frames (across the rows) yields 
striking differences in the percentage of respondents selecting risk-averse and risk-
seeking actions, as illustrated in Table 4 by the different shaped symbols surrounding 
the percentages. For instance, the circled numbers of 65 and 9 in section (a), rows 
1 and 2, indicate that 65 per cent of those presented with a gain frame in the 100-
home problem chose the risk-averse option, whereas only 9 per cent of those pre-
sented with a loss frame in the 100-home problem chose the risk-averse option. The 
same Somers’s D—in this case with two binary variables—can be used to demon-
strate a statistically significant difference at less than a 0.01 level. A Somers’ D value 
of 0.56 in the top half of Table 4 shows that EMs presented with the 100-home 
context and a gain frame are 56 per cent more likely to choose a risk-averse option than 
those presented with the 100-home context and a loss frame. Similarly, the same 
Somers’ D value of 0.56 in the lower half of Table 4 shows that EMs presented with 
the 500-home context and a gain frame are 56 per cent more likely to choose a risk-
averse option than those presented with a loss frame. 
 Consistent with the caution about avoiding misleading conclusions from the dif-
ferent outcomes in Scenario I, the differences in preferred actions in equivalent situ-
ations framed as losses or as gains do not suggest one frame encourages better choices 
than the other. Rather, the salience of framing suggests that the threat of a loss will 
weigh more heavily in an emergency management decision than the possibility of an 
equivalent gain. Stated differently, EMs appear more likely to pursue aggressive, more 
risky actions to reduce threats when perceived potential losses are involved than when 
perceived potential gains are at stake. 
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Scenario III: omissions and commissions bias among 
emergency managers 
Neither of the first two scenarios forces EMs to choose between two actions that each 
could yield a bad outcome, either acting on uncertain information about a forecasted 
event that may not occur, or not acting on uncertain information about a forecasted 
event that may occur. The first eventuality may mean incurring unnecessary costs 
and getting ‘nailed to the wall’ vis-à-vis public opinion for issuing a false warning 
(Donner, 2008), while the second may engender damages that could have been 
lessened. Therefore, the EM respondents were asked in the final scenarios about their 
attitudes regarding making a choice whether to utilise a long-term forecast that, in 
hindsight, turns out to be a wrong move. These are referred to here as a ‘commission 
miscalculation’ and an ‘omission miscalculation’, or mis-commit and mis-omit in 
shorthand. A ‘commission miscalculation’ refers to choosing to take a costly action 
in response to a seasonal forecast that indicates an elevated risk of a destructive flood 
occurring in the next three months, and then not having any such event occur. In 
contrast, an ‘omission miscalculation’ refers to making a choice not to take an action 
in response to such a forecast and then having a destructive flood occur. In both 
cases, a destructive flood is described as one that would severely damage or destroy 
infrastructure and a large number of homes and businesses in the county, with full 
recovery possibly taking at least one year. In addition, it was asserted that a decision to 
take action in response to the forecast would necessitate considerable effort and the 
expenditure of a significant amount of the county’s annual emergency management 
budget, and that the actions would need to begin immediately. Several statements were 
then provided that described possible implications of the mis-commit and mis-omit 
situations, and the EMs were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each. 
 Section (a) on the left-hand side of Table 5 shows the results pertaining to one 
of these statements, specifically the level of agreement with the statement that ‘in 
light of my decision to take action, and because the forecasted flood did not occur, 
I would feel [ . . . ] about the security of my job (n=55) or in light of my decision 
to not take action, and because the forecasted flood did occur, I would feel [ . . . ] 
about the security of my job (n=62)’. Possible response categories in the [brackets] 
spanned a seven-point Likert scale, with one indicating ‘extreme concern’ and seven 
indicating ‘extreme confidence’. As Table 5 shows, a far smaller proportion of the 
group in the mis-commit category (taking an action but the flood does not occur) 
expressed high (a rating of one to three) concern about job security than the group 
in the mis-omit category (not taking action but the flood does occur). The differ-
ences between the two groups are significantly different statistically at the 0.001 level, 
using the Somers’ D test. Here, the -0.65 test statistic value means that those given 
the mis-commit treatment are 65 per cent more likely to be less concerned that their 
miscalculation will impact job security than those given the mis-omit treatment. 
These differences are not inconsistent with the framing effects discussed above, but 
we cannot tell for sure whether they reflect differences in risk aversion and framing 
since we did not force equivalency between the expected costs and benefits. 
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Scenario IV: attribution bias among emergency managers 
The questions about forecast use miscalculations also permit an indirect evaluation 
of the potential presence of attribution bias among EMs. In particular, a scenario was 
presented where some EMs were asked to indicate whether the presence of a com-
mission miscalculation would cause them to be less or more willing to use forecasts 
in the future. Others were asked the same question but with respect to other EMs 
rather than to themselves. A difference in responses to these formulations might indi-
cate the presence of ‘attribution bias’, which could suggest potential concerns about 
the formation of false consensus in decision-making and/or self-serving behaviour 
that ignores constructive negative feedback. Specifically:
Assume that you decided to take action to reduce the risks associated with a potential flood, 
and the expected flood did not occur. How do you think this experience would affect your 
willingness to take action to reduce the risks associated with a similar flood forecast in the 
future? (n=55)
or
Assume that an emergency manager who is unknown to you, and who works in a different 
county, decided to take action to reduce the risks associated with a potential flood, and the 
expected flood did not occur. How do you think this experience would affect the manager’s 
willingness to take action to reduce the risks associated with a similar flood forecast in the 
future? (n=58)
 Responses ranged from one (‘I [They] would be much LESS willing to take action 
in the future’) to seven (‘I [They] would be much MORE willing to take action in 
Table 5. Mis-commit and mis-omit scenarios: job security and action willingness
Job concern and 
action willingness
Job security concerns Willingness to take action
(i) Mis-commit 
scenario 
(ii) Mis-omit  
scenario 
(iii) Willingness 
of self to act 
(iv) Perceived willingness 
of others to act 
1 4 27 0 2
2 5 21 0 10
3 9 16 18 36
4 22 21 56 29
5 15 14 16 14
6 33 16 11 5
7 13 6 0 3
Notes: cell entries reflect percentages; columns sum 100 per cent.
Source: authors.
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the future’), with four indicating that the ‘experience would have no effect on my 
[their] future decisions’. 
 Section (b), the right-hand side of Table 5, shows statistically significant differences 
(at the 0.001 level, using the Somers’ D test) between the responses of the two groups. 
A clear majority of EMs reporting their own willingness to use forecasts indicated 
that the mis-omit experience would have no effect on their willingness to use simi-
lar forecast information in the future. Most of the rest indicated that it would make 
them more willing to use such information. In contrast, nearly one-half of EMs report-
ing on the willingness of neighbouring EMs to use forecasts in the future, indicated 
that those EMs would be less willing to do so (a response rate of one, two, or three). 
 We do not know for sure why this difference in anticipated behaviour appears, 
but one plausible explanation is the contribution of ‘social desirability’ bias; that is, 
the EM survey respondents may be answering questions about their own intended 
behaviour that will reflect favourably on them (and not have this pressure when 
responding to questions about the intended behaviour of others). The discrepancy 
between self and other behaviour may also reflect an elevation of personality in 
explaining the actions of others. This would be consistent with an attribution bias. 
However, the differences between the own and other perspective do not appear in 
the analogous question about an omission miscalculation. The results are not shown 
here, but nearly all of the EM respondents in both the own and other perspective 
groups reported an increased willingness to use future forecast information in the 
wake of a past failure to do so and then having the forecasted flood occur. A solid 
explanation of this requires further research, but it may reflect a higher risk tolerance 
when losses are at stake. 
Conclusion
The results of the survey offer evidence regarding the role of forecast uncertainty in 
motivating EMs to take action. The central expectation motivating the study holds 
that both shorter- and longer-term forecast information can improve hazard man-
agement, and several examples have demonstrated this. The use of longer-term climate 
forecasts in emergency management in particular remains limited, however, in part 
because the greater uncertainty inherent to such forecasts and less familiarity with them 
place an especially large cognitive burden on local emergency decision-making. 
 The survey results demonstrated consistently a greater aversion to acts of omis-
sion—not taking action in response to a forecast indicating a higher than normal 
likelihood of flooding, and then experiencing the forecasted flooding—than to acts 
of commission. Furthermore, EMs take different actions in response to forecasts when 
outcomes are framed as gains than when they are framed as losses, a systematic bias 
that attention to framing may mitigate. When a decision is framed as a gain, EMs are 
more likely to prefer a sure outcome. When a decision is framed as a loss, they are 
more prone to gamble. Neither option is better on its face, but the difference suggests 
that forecast framing can influence emergency management decision-making. 
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 In addition, the results related to numeracy challenges—the ability of EMs to 
process numerical information consistently—reveal that forecast providers should 
present uncertain information with care. Statistically significant differences were 
found in the responses of EMs to a question about activating a costly emergency man-
agement plan depending on how the forecast likelihood is presented. In particular, 
forecasts using proportions (0.1 and 0.9, for instance) made EMs less likely to take 
action than when presented with identical likelihoods expressed as frequencies (such 
as 1 in 10 and 9 in 10). The difference was statistically significant for the lower value 
comparison (1 in 10 and 0.1), perhaps because EMs routinely confront these probabil-
ities. Finally, there is evidence of a potential bias in viewing the actions and motivations 
of other EMs as compared to those of oneself. When presented with situations where 
EMs miscalculated and took an expensive action in response to a forecast, only to 
have the forecasted event not occur, significantly more EMs reported that other EMs 
would be less likely to take action in response to a similar forecast in the future. In 
other words, EMs perceived that others in their profession would have the viewpoint 
‘once bitten, twice shy’. At the very least, the response indicates a difference in how 
EMs see their own actions and those of others. It suggests that EMs could hesitate 
to act after preparing for a forecasted event that never happened, but that the self-
evaluation cannot be trusted because of social desirability bias, while the evaluation 
of others appears less subject to this bias. 
 The broadest lesson is that EMs with substantial experience employ biases and 
heuristics, just as do members of the general population or the students that many 
psychologists use in their experiments and surveys. The producers of forecasts should 
take such cognitive aspects into account when developing products. Borrowing ter-
minology from Marincioni (2007), who has assessed the role of information technol-
ogy in shaping interaction in local emergency management, technocentric approaches 
that focus on technical elements of forecasts need to be supplemented by anthropocen-
tric approaches that concentrate on individual-level human capabilities and resources. 
As a simple example, forecasts can be expressed in multiple ways—frequencies and 
probabilities, and perhaps in graphical and narrative formats as well—to give EMs 
multiple angles from which to approach a problem. Selecting one expression of data 
alone as the most technically ideal way to present information may bias the interpre-
tation, stimulating systematically more risk-averse or more risk-seeking behaviour 
than other presentation arrangements. 
 Extrapolating the survey results to more settings requires several qualifications, 
though. While the findings appear robust across a wide cross-section of the US—
responses are from EMs in 29 states, all regions of the country, and rural and non-
rural settings—the sample precludes a claim of full representativeness and the ability 
to develop population-level estimates of behaviour in all contexts. In addition, some 
of the findings may not apply to other emergency environments with more ephemeral 
weather-related hazards, such as tornadoes. These may appear too dynamically and 
unpredictably for forecast information to offer much utility to EMs (Donner, 2008). 
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What is more, biases may be exacerbated (or attenuated) by emergency management 
activities that bring group dynamics into play, such as within emergency manage-
ment networks (Roberts and Wernstedt, 2016) or large-scale evacuations in disaster 
response settings (Hotchkiss, Aguirre, and Best, 2013). Although the survey experi-
ments discussed here stylistically emphasise individual cognitive processes, group 
biases probably shape emergency management decisions in important ways on the 
ground that the questionnaire did not capture. 
 Notwithstanding these caveats, for both individual and group decisions, the work 
suggests that EMs would rather be prepared for a disaster, and risk financial and 
reputational costs and not have it happen, than be caught flatfooted and unprepared. 
The politics of blame in emergency management may be different in other domains 
where the results of managerial decisions are less salient. The history of disaster 
management shows that EMs and their agencies are more likely to be blamed for 
something that occurs than to be rewarded for mitigating or preventing a disaster 
that did not happen, largely because the same blame dynamics apply to their political 
superiors (Roberts, 2013, pp. 70–145). While understandable and probably the only 
politically palatable choice, this built-in risk aversion can stifle the kind of longer-
term, learning-rich, ‘riskier’ policy choices that Matyas and Pelling (2015) assert 
decision-makers need to consider to generate deeper community resilience. 
 In the meantime, more data may shed light on what factors cause the judgements 
of EMs to vary from what utility theory would predict and more effective resilience 
would demand. Does education or experience improve decisions? Are seasoned EMs 
more wary of committing acts of omission because of having been stung by criticism 
in the past? Further research on the decision processes of EMs should also assess the 
context in which they interpret data and make decisions. Do they read charts and 
discuss actions alone in their office? At meetings? With peers by social media or 
telephone? If even experienced EMs are subject to decision biases, then the decision 
context becomes important. 
 Structured decision processes involving multiple stakeholders have the potential 
to mitigate some of these biases and to improve determinations, measured both by 
satisfaction with the process, and by outcomes. Most research in environmental 
resource management situations shows how processes that begin by clarifying norms 
and values and identifying alternatives and trade-offs have led participants to be 
much happier with their decision outcomes than in cases where they made deci-
sions without such processes (Arvai and Gregory, 2003; Gregory and Long, 2009; 
Gregory et al., 2012). In the hazard forecasts context, a more detailed study of actual 
decision-making by EMs in Oregon reveals that managers who engaged in group 
decision processes where they clarified goals, developed feasible alternatives, and tied 
forecasts to specific tasks were able to use seasonal climate forecasts to prepare for 
floods while most county EMs were not (Roberts and Wernstedt, 2016). In addition, 
regular interaction between forecast providers and EMs increased understanding of 
forecast products and their utility, consistent with work with subsistence farmers that 
How emergency managers (mis?)interpret forecasts 105
suggests that participatory educational sessions in areas with strong seasonal climate 
signals have helped to decrease the cognitive challenges of interpreting probabilistic 
information, and increased farmers’ use of seasonal forecasts (Patt and Gwata, 2002; 
Patt, Suarez, and Gwata, 2005). 
 The presence of decision biases, as psychologists put it, or departures from the 
utility model, as economists prefer to say, matters for how forecasters communicate 
prepare for disasters and hazards. The forecast products themselves should present 
uncertainty in a variety of formats and take into account the ways in which numbers 
and stories can shape decisions. Finally, beyond the products themselves, forecasters 
often communicate with government managers and guide their interpretation of 
forecast information. This interaction furnishes an opportunity to mitigate the impact 
of decision biases and ensure consideration of multiple perspectives on a problem.
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